Blockchain competition: The tradeoff between platform stability and efficiency | |
Jiang, Shangrong1; Li, Yuze2,3; Wang, Shouyang1,2; Zhao, Lin2 | |
刊名 | EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH |
2022-02-01 | |
卷号 | 296期号:3页码:1084-1097 |
关键词 | Game theory Blockchain Platform competition Empirical analysis |
ISSN号 | 0377-2217 |
DOI | 10.1016/j.ejor.2021.05.031 |
英文摘要 | Since 2017, the Bitcoin blockchain system has experienced 105 fork divergences. The rapidly increasing blockchain forks have resulted in fierce competition and created significant controversies in blockchain community. To analyze this competitive aspect, we consider blockchain as a two-sided platform that serves both customers and miners. We develop a game-theoretic model to investigate how a blockchain platform's decision on its settings, such as block size and transaction fee, affects the competition between blockchain platforms as well as the participation behavior of customers and miners. Our findings suggest that increasing the transaction fee alleviates congestion on the platform when customers have a relatively balanced need between efficiency and safety. In contrast, it induces congestion when efficiency is valued over safety. In addition, under hard fork competition, the difference in blockchain platforms' block sizes directs the attention of miners towards different types of mining rewards. Moreover, it also affects the optimal types of customers the blockchain platforms should target. Furthermore, we find that the degree of congestion and the risk attitudes of participants play vital roles in differentiating different block-sized platforms' optimal transaction fees. We provide empirical evidence on the theoretical findings and practical implications for blockchain platform competition with respect to the behaviors of platform participants. (c) 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. |
资助项目 | National Natural Science Foundation of China[71988101] |
WOS研究方向 | Business & Economics ; Operations Research & Management Science |
语种 | 英语 |
出版者 | ELSEVIER |
WOS记录号 | WOS:000705404300023 |
内容类型 | 期刊论文 |
源URL | [http://ir.amss.ac.cn/handle/2S8OKBNM/59389] |
专题 | 中国科学院数学与系统科学研究院 |
通讯作者 | Wang, Shouyang |
作者单位 | 1.Univ Chinese Acad Sci, Sch Econ & Management, Beijing 100190, Peoples R China 2.Chinese Acad Sci, Acad Math & Syst Sci, Zhongguancun East Rd 55, Beijing 100190, Peoples R China 3.Boston Univ, Questrom Sch Business, Boston, MA 02215 USA |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jiang, Shangrong,Li, Yuze,Wang, Shouyang,et al. Blockchain competition: The tradeoff between platform stability and efficiency[J]. EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH,2022,296(3):1084-1097. |
APA | Jiang, Shangrong,Li, Yuze,Wang, Shouyang,&Zhao, Lin.(2022).Blockchain competition: The tradeoff between platform stability and efficiency.EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH,296(3),1084-1097. |
MLA | Jiang, Shangrong,et al."Blockchain competition: The tradeoff between platform stability and efficiency".EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH 296.3(2022):1084-1097. |
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