Top-runner incentive scheme in China: a theoretical and empirical study for industrial pollution control

doi:10.1007/s11356-021-12561-1

	Top-runner incentive scheme in China: a theoretical and empirical study for industrial pollution control
	Chang, Dunhu 1; Gao, Donghui 1; Xu, Xiangbo 2,3; Wang, Xin 4; Ju, Ying 1; Shen, Xiaoyue 5
刊名	ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE AND POLLUTION RESEARCH
	2021-02-08
页码	13
关键词	Top-runner Pollution control Environmental performance Economic incentive policy Selection standard Incentive method
ISSN号	0944-1344
DOI	10.1007/s11356-021-12561-1
通讯作者	Xu, Xiangbo(ydxu.ccap@igsnrr.ac.cn)
英文摘要	Pollution control policies have achieved remarkable results in China. However, industrial firms still lack enthusiasm for technological innovation to reduce pollution and endogenous motivation for controlling pollution, which pose severe obstacles to industrial pollution control. The top-runner scheme can stimulate the pollution control behaviors of firms to a certain extent. Therefore, the top-runner scheme is combined with economic incentive policies to design an appropriate incentive scheme in this paper, theoretical research is conducted on the selection standards and incentive methods, and four industries mainly responsible for pollution in a developed province of China are investigated as case studies. The results show that (1) the selection standard that stipulates the rewarded quotas instead of the discharge amount achieved higher emission reduction efficiency; (2) tax cuts are the best incentive for top-runners, and (3) the top-runner incentive scheme achieves a greater reduction effect in high-pollution industries than low-pollution industries. Value-added tax exemption for the top-runner, as determined by the rewarded quotas, contributes to increasing the enthusiasm from firms to participate in and improve pollution control measures.
资助项目	Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities ; Research Funds of Renmin University of China[17XNB025]
WOS研究方向	Environmental Sciences & Ecology
语种	英语
出版者	SPRINGER HEIDELBERG
WOS记录号	WOS:000616157600004
资助机构	Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities ; Research Funds of Renmin University of China
内容类型	期刊论文
源URL	[http://ir.igsnrr.ac.cn/handle/311030/160667]
专题	中国科学院地理科学与资源研究所
通讯作者	Xu, Xiangbo
作者单位	1.Renmin Univ China, Sch Environm & Nat Resources, Beijing 100872, Peoples R China 2.Chinese Acad Sci, Inst Geog Sci & Nat Resources Res, Key Lab Ecosyst Network Observat & Modeling, Beijing 100101, Peoples R China 3.United Nations Environm Programme, Int Ecosyst Management Partnership, Beijing 100101, Peoples R China 4.Minist Ecol & Environm, China Natl Environm Monitoring Ctr, Beijing 100012, Peoples R China 5.Minist Ecol & Environm, Policy Res Ctr Environm & Econ, Beijing 100029, Peoples R China
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Chang, Dunhu,Gao, Donghui,Xu, Xiangbo,et al. Top-runner incentive scheme in China: a theoretical and empirical study for industrial pollution control[J]. ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE AND POLLUTION RESEARCH,2021:13.
APA	Chang, Dunhu,Gao, Donghui,Xu, Xiangbo,Wang, Xin,Ju, Ying,&Shen, Xiaoyue.(2021).Top-runner incentive scheme in China: a theoretical and empirical study for industrial pollution control.ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE AND POLLUTION RESEARCH,13.
MLA	Chang, Dunhu,et al."Top-runner incentive scheme in China: a theoretical and empirical study for industrial pollution control".ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE AND POLLUTION RESEARCH (2021):13.