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	Optimal contract design for dual-channel supply chains under information asymmetry
	KevinJiangLu; GuoqingZhang; HonglinYang; ErbaoCao
刊名	Journal of Business & Industrial Marketing
	2017
卷号	Vol.32 No.8页码:1087-1097
关键词	Electronic commerce Game theory Contracts Supply chain management Information asymmetry Revenue sharing contract Dual-channel
ISSN号	0885-8624
URL标识	查看原文
公开日期	[db:dc_date_available]
内容类型	期刊论文
URI标识	http://www.corc.org.cn/handle/1471x/5380474
专题	上海电子信息职业技术学院
作者单位	1.School of Business Administration, Hunan University, Changsha, China 2.Department of Mechanical, Automotive & Materials Engineering, University of Windsor, Windsor, Canada 3.College of Economics and Trade, Hunan University, Changsha, China 4.Brunel University, London, UK
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	KevinJiangLu,GuoqingZhang,HonglinYang,et al. Optimal contract design for dual-channel supply chains under information asymmetry[J]. Journal of Business & Industrial Marketing,2017,Vol.32 No.8:1087-1097.
APA	KevinJiangLu,GuoqingZhang,HonglinYang,&ErbaoCao.(2017).Optimal contract design for dual-channel supply chains under information asymmetry.Journal of Business & Industrial Marketing,Vol.32 No.8,1087-1097.
MLA	KevinJiangLu,et al."Optimal contract design for dual-channel supply chains under information asymmetry".Journal of Business & Industrial Marketing Vol.32 No.8(2017):1087-1097.

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