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	A truthful mechanism for optimally purchasing iaas instances and scheduling parallel jobs in service clouds
	Zheng, Bingbing; Pan, Li; Yuan, Dong; Liu, Shijun; Shi, Yuliang; Wang, Lu
刊名	Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
	2018
卷号	11236 LNCS页码:651-659
关键词	Auction mechanism Pricing Scheduling Service cloud
DOI	10.1007/978-3-030-03596-9_47
会议名称	16th International Conference on Service-Oriented Computing, ICSOC 2018
URL标识	查看原文
会议日期	12 November 2018 through 15 November 2018
公开日期	[db:dc_date_available]
内容类型	期刊论文
URI标识	http://www.corc.org.cn/handle/1471x/4582223
专题	山东大学
作者单位	1.School of Software, Shandong University, Jinan, China 2.Dareway Softwar
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Zheng, Bingbing,Pan, Li,Yuan, Dong,et al. A truthful mechanism for optimally purchasing iaas instances and scheduling parallel jobs in service clouds[J]. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics),2018,11236 LNCS:651-659.
APA	Zheng, Bingbing,Pan, Li,Yuan, Dong,Liu, Shijun,Shi, Yuliang,&Wang, Lu.(2018).A truthful mechanism for optimally purchasing iaas instances and scheduling parallel jobs in service clouds.Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics),11236 LNCS,651-659.
MLA	Zheng, Bingbing,et al."A truthful mechanism for optimally purchasing iaas instances and scheduling parallel jobs in service clouds".Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) 11236 LNCS(2018):651-659.

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