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	Strategical interactions on municipal public safety spending with correlated private information
	Yang, Chao1,2; Lee, Lung-fei3
	2018-09
关键词	Spatial correlation Strategic interactions Public finance Fixed point Numerical approximation
卷号	72
DOI	10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2017.03.003
页码	86-102
英文摘要	We investigate interactions of public safety spending among spatially related local jurisdictions in a framework of simultaneous move game both theoretically and empirically. Incorporating the mobility of residents and externality of public safety services, it is found that the public safety spending of a municipal government can be negatively related to those of its neighbors, which is empirically supported by a general interaction model with correlated private information using the data on municipalities in North Carolina. In this case, strategic interactions induce a reduction of municipal public safety spending by 7.2404% on average and a local government will reduce its own spending by 0.0927 million dollars when one of its neighbors is expected to increase public safety spending by 1 million dollars, showing strong "free-riding" effects.
会议录出版者	ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
会议录出版地	PO BOX 211, 1000 AE AMSTERDAM, NETHERLANDS
语种	英语
WOS研究方向	Business & Economics ; Environmental Sciences & Ecology ; Urban Studies
WOS记录号	WOS:000454968200006
内容类型	会议论文
源URL	[http://10.2.47.112/handle/2XS4QKH4/3330]
专题	上海财经大学
作者单位	1.Shanghai Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Econ, Shanghai, Peoples R China; 2.Minist Educ, Key Lab Math Econ SUFE, Shanghai, Peoples R China; 3.Ohio State Univ, Dept Econ, 475 Arps Hall,1945 N High St, Columbus, OH 43210 USA
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Yang, Chao,Lee, Lung-fei. Strategical interactions on municipal public safety spending with correlated private information[C]. 见:.

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