The merger-paradox: A tournament-based solution

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2014.11.023

CORC > 上海财经大学 > 上海财经大学

	The merger-paradox: A tournament-based solution
	Fan, Cuihong 1; Wolfstetter, Elmar G.2,3
刊名	ECONOMICS LETTERS
	2015-02
卷号	127 页码:35-38
关键词	Mergers Multi-divisional firms Tournaments Industrial organization
ISSN号	0165-1765
DOI	10.1016/j.econlet.2014.11.023
英文摘要	According to the well-known "merger paradox", in a Cournot market game mergers are generally unprofitable unless most firms merge. The present paper proposes an optimal merger mechanism. With this mechanism mergers are never unprofitable, more profitable than in other known mechanisms, and in many cases welfare increasing. The proposed mechanism assumes that merged firms continue to operate as independent subsidiaries that are rewarded according to a simple and commonly observed relative performance measure. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
WOS研究方向	Business & Economics
语种	英语
出版者	ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA
WOS记录号	WOS:000350094400010
内容类型	期刊论文
源URL	[http://10.2.47.112/handle/2XS4QKH4/1599]
专题	上海财经大学
通讯作者	Fan, Cuihong
作者单位	1.Shanghai Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Econ, Shanghai 200433, Peoples R China; 2.Humboldt Univ, Dept Econ, D-10178 Berlin, Germany; 3.Korea Univ, Seoul, South Korea
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Fan, Cuihong,Wolfstetter, Elmar G.. The merger-paradox: A tournament-based solution[J]. ECONOMICS LETTERS,2015,127:35-38.
APA	Fan, Cuihong,&Wolfstetter, Elmar G..(2015).The merger-paradox: A tournament-based solution.ECONOMICS LETTERS,127,35-38.
MLA	Fan, Cuihong,et al."The merger-paradox: A tournament-based solution".ECONOMICS LETTERS 127(2015):35-38.