Optimal licensing under incomplete information: the case of the inside patent holder

doi:10.1007/s00199-017-1077-5

CORC > 上海财经大学 > 上海财经大学

	Optimal licensing under incomplete information: the case of the inside patent holder
	Fan, Cuihong 1; Jun, Byoung Heon 2; Wolfstetter, Elmar G.2,3
刊名	ECONOMIC THEORY
	2018-12
卷号	66 期号:4 页码:979-1005
关键词	Innovation Licensing Optimal contracts Asymmetric information
ISSN号	0938-2259
DOI	10.1007/s00199-017-1077-5
英文摘要	We reconsider the inside patent holders' optimal licensing problem of non-drastic and (super-) drastic innovations under incomplete information, taking into account restrictions concerning royalty rates and the use of exclusive licenses implied by antitrust rules. We employ methods developed in the analysis of license auctions with downstream interaction and optimal control theory. Our analysis differs from the literature which assumed particular patterns of cost reductions across firms induced by the innovation and either complete information or particular probability distributions.
WOS研究方向	Business & Economics
语种	英语
出版者	SPRINGER
WOS记录号	WOS:000450488100006
内容类型	期刊论文
源URL	[http://10.2.47.112/handle/2XS4QKH4/459]
专题	上海财经大学
通讯作者	Fan, Cuihong
作者单位	1.Shanghai Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Econ, 777 Guoding Rd, Shanghai 200433, Peoples R China; 2.Korea Univ, Dept Econ, 145 Anam Ro, Seoul 02841, South Korea; 3.Humboldt Univ, Inst F Wirtschaftstheorie 1, Spandauer Str 1, D-10178 Berlin, Germany
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Fan, Cuihong,Jun, Byoung Heon,Wolfstetter, Elmar G.. Optimal licensing under incomplete information: the case of the inside patent holder[J]. ECONOMIC THEORY,2018,66(4):979-1005.
APA	Fan, Cuihong,Jun, Byoung Heon,&Wolfstetter, Elmar G..(2018).Optimal licensing under incomplete information: the case of the inside patent holder.ECONOMIC THEORY,66(4),979-1005.
MLA	Fan, Cuihong,et al."Optimal licensing under incomplete information: the case of the inside patent holder".ECONOMIC THEORY 66.4(2018):979-1005.