Procurement auctions under quality manipulation corruption

doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2018.11.001

CORC > 上海财经大学 > 上海财经大学

	Procurement auctions under quality manipulation corruption
	Huang, Yangguang 1; Xia, Jijun 2
刊名	EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
	2019-01
卷号	111 页码:380-399
关键词	Scoring auction Quality manipulation Corruption Procurement
ISSN号	0014-2921
DOI	10.1016/j.euroecorev.2018.11.001
英文摘要	In procurement, quality manipulation corruption arises when the agent tasked with quality evaluation exaggerates the quality of a corrupt firm. If an inefficient firm is favored by the agent, the buyer can adjust the procurement mechanism such that the corruption rent of the inefficient firm erodes the technological rent of the efficient firm; however, doing so may require procuring the project at an undesirable quality level. To resolve this trade-off between corruption deterrence and quality distortion, unlike standard results in the literature, the buyer may overstate her preference for quality, and the dominance of scoring auctions over minimum-quality auctions disappears. (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
WOS研究方向	Business & Economics
语种	英语
出版者	ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
WOS记录号	WOS:000456229100018
内容类型	期刊论文
源URL	[http://10.2.47.112/handle/2XS4QKH4/414]
专题	上海财经大学
通讯作者	Huang, Yangguang
作者单位	1.Hong Kong Univ Sci & Technol, Dept Econ, Clear Water Bay, Hong Kong, Peoples R China; 2.Shanghai Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Econ, 111 Wuchuan Rd, Shanghai 200433, Peoples R China
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Huang, Yangguang,Xia, Jijun. Procurement auctions under quality manipulation corruption[J]. EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW,2019,111:380-399.
APA	Huang, Yangguang,&Xia, Jijun.(2019).Procurement auctions under quality manipulation corruption.EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW,111,380-399.
MLA	Huang, Yangguang,et al."Procurement auctions under quality manipulation corruption".EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 111(2019):380-399.