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	How the Strategy Continuity Influences the Evolution of Cooperation in Spatial Prisoner's Dilemma Game with Interaction Stochasticity
	Zhao, Xiaowei ; Xu, Xiujuan ; Liu, Wangpeng ; Huang, Yixuan ; Xu, Zhenzhen
	2016
关键词	Evolution of cooperation Spatial altruism Prisoner&apos Interaction stochasticity Strategy continuity s dilemma
英文摘要	The evolution of cooperation among selfish individuals is a fundamental issue in artificial intelligence. Recent work has revealed that interaction stochasticity can promote cooperation in evolutionary spatial prisoner's dilemma games. Considering the players' strategies in previous works are discrete (either cooperation or defection), we focus on the evolutionary spatial prisoner's dilemma game with continuous strategy based on interaction stochasticity mechanism. In this paper, we find that strategy continuity do not enhance the cooperation level. The simulation results show that the cooperation level is lower if the strategies are continuous when the interaction rate is low. With higher interaction rate, the cooperation levels of continuous-strategy system and the discrete-strategy system are very close. The reason behind the phenomena is also given. Our results may shed some light on the role of continuous strategy and interaction stochasticity in the emergence and persistence of cooperation in spatial network.; EI; CPCI-S(ISTP); xiaowei.zhao@dlut.edu.cn; xjxu@dlut.edu.cn; 459267269@qq.com; orangehix@outlook.com; xzz@dlut.edu.cn; 808-817; 9799
语种	英语
出处	29th International Conference on Industrial, Engineering and Other Applications of Applied Intelligent Systems (IEA/AIE)
DOI标识	10.1007/978-3-319-42007-3_68
内容类型	其他
源URL	[http://ir.pku.edu.cn/handle/20.500.11897/449608]
专题	软件与微电子学院
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Zhao, Xiaowei,Xu, Xiujuan,Liu, Wangpeng,et al. How the Strategy Continuity Influences the Evolution of Cooperation in Spatial Prisoner's Dilemma Game with Interaction Stochasticity. 2016-01-01.

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