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Designing an Incentive Contract Menu for Sustaining the Electricity Market
Yu, Ying[1]; Jin, Tongdan[2]; Zhong, Chunjie[3]
刊名ENERGIES
2015
卷号8页码:14197-14218
关键词stackelberg game Q-learning multi-agent simulation electricity market incentive mechanism
ISSN号1996-1073
URL标识查看原文
内容类型期刊论文
URI标识http://www.corc.org.cn/handle/1471x/2266530
专题上海大学
作者单位1.[1]Shanghai Univ, Sch Mechatron Engn & Automat, Shanghai 200072, Peoples R China.
2.[2]Texas State Univ, Ingram Sch Engn, San Marcos, TX 78666 USA.
3.[3]Shanghai Univ, Sch Mechatron Engn & Automat, Shanghai 200072, Peoples R China.
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Yu, Ying[1],Jin, Tongdan[2],Zhong, Chunjie[3]. Designing an Incentive Contract Menu for Sustaining the Electricity Market[J]. ENERGIES,2015,8:14197-14218.
APA Yu, Ying[1],Jin, Tongdan[2],&Zhong, Chunjie[3].(2015).Designing an Incentive Contract Menu for Sustaining the Electricity Market.ENERGIES,8,14197-14218.
MLA Yu, Ying[1],et al."Designing an Incentive Contract Menu for Sustaining the Electricity Market".ENERGIES 8(2015):14197-14218.
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