Designing an Incentive Contract Menu for Sustaining the Electricity Market | |
Yu, Ying[1]; Jin, Tongdan[2]; Zhong, Chunjie[3] | |
刊名 | ENERGIES
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2015 | |
卷号 | 8页码:14197-14218 |
关键词 | stackelberg game Q-learning multi-agent simulation electricity market incentive mechanism |
ISSN号 | 1996-1073 |
URL标识 | 查看原文 |
内容类型 | 期刊论文 |
URI标识 | http://www.corc.org.cn/handle/1471x/2266530 |
专题 | 上海大学 |
作者单位 | 1.[1]Shanghai Univ, Sch Mechatron Engn & Automat, Shanghai 200072, Peoples R China. 2.[2]Texas State Univ, Ingram Sch Engn, San Marcos, TX 78666 USA. 3.[3]Shanghai Univ, Sch Mechatron Engn & Automat, Shanghai 200072, Peoples R China. |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Yu, Ying[1],Jin, Tongdan[2],Zhong, Chunjie[3]. Designing an Incentive Contract Menu for Sustaining the Electricity Market[J]. ENERGIES,2015,8:14197-14218. |
APA | Yu, Ying[1],Jin, Tongdan[2],&Zhong, Chunjie[3].(2015).Designing an Incentive Contract Menu for Sustaining the Electricity Market.ENERGIES,8,14197-14218. |
MLA | Yu, Ying[1],et al."Designing an Incentive Contract Menu for Sustaining the Electricity Market".ENERGIES 8(2015):14197-14218. |
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