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	Designing an Incentive Contract Menu for Sustaining the Electricity Market
	Yu, Ying[1]; Jin, Tongdan[2]; Zhong, Chunjie[3]
刊名	ENERGIES
	2015
卷号	8页码:14197-14218
关键词	stackelberg game Q-learning multi-agent simulation electricity market incentive mechanism
ISSN号	1996-1073
URL标识	查看原文
内容类型	期刊论文
URI标识	http://www.corc.org.cn/handle/1471x/2266530
专题	上海大学
作者单位	1.[1]Shanghai Univ, Sch Mechatron Engn & Automat, Shanghai 200072, Peoples R China. 2.[2]Texas State Univ, Ingram Sch Engn, San Marcos, TX 78666 USA. 3.[3]Shanghai Univ, Sch Mechatron Engn & Automat, Shanghai 200072, Peoples R China.
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Yu, Ying[1],Jin, Tongdan[2],Zhong, Chunjie[3]. Designing an Incentive Contract Menu for Sustaining the Electricity Market[J]. ENERGIES,2015,8:14197-14218.
APA	Yu, Ying[1],Jin, Tongdan[2],&Zhong, Chunjie[3].(2015).Designing an Incentive Contract Menu for Sustaining the Electricity Market.ENERGIES,8,14197-14218.
MLA	Yu, Ying[1],et al."Designing an Incentive Contract Menu for Sustaining the Electricity Market".ENERGIES 8(2015):14197-14218.

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