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	Game analysis of the adverse selection formation mechanism on engineering quality risk based on information asymmetry
	Deng, Jian Xun ; Deng JX(邓建勋)
	2013
关键词	Commerce Engineering Highway bridges Risk assessment Risk management
英文摘要	Conference Name:2013 3rd International Conference on Mechanical Science and Engineering, ICMSE 2013. Conference Address: Hong Kong, China. Time:March 1, 2013 - March 3, 2013.; Zhengzhou University; University of Sydney; TTP Press; Internat. Assoc. of Manag. Sci. and Eng. Technol. (IAMSET); Advanced Institute of Convergence Information Technology (AICIT); The paper makes a deep analysis of the adverse selection formation mechanism under the condition of information asymmetry through the establishment of adverse selection game model in construction market. The paper seeks the root of the construction market risk based on the perspective of information economics. Due to asymmetric information, the adverse selection makes the low strength level engineering quality responsible units expel the high strength level engineering quality responsible units form the construction market, and greatly increases the risk of the construction market, which will make it difficult for construction engineering quality to be guaranteed, and lead to engineering project quality risk. The paper puts forward some effective countermeasures and suggestions to avoid construction market quality risk from both sides of the construction information symmetry angle. ? (2013) Trans Tech Publications, Switzerland.
语种	英语
出处	http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMM.328.334
出版者	Trans Tech Publications Ltd
内容类型	其他
源URL	[http://dspace.xmu.edu.cn/handle/2288/85501]
专题	建筑土木－会议论文
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Deng, Jian Xun,Deng JX. Game analysis of the adverse selection formation mechanism on engineering quality risk based on information asymmetry. 2013-01-01.

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