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	从“欧猪五国”到“新重债七国”——再论欧洲主权债务危机治理; Analysis with Game Evolution on Governance of European Sovereign Debt Crisis
	袁国龙
	2014-03-20
关键词	欧债危机 演化博弈 约束机制 European debt crisis evolutionary game constraint mechanism
英文摘要	欧债危机自发生迄今已近四年,欧元区各方为有效解决债务危机做出了各种努力,然而效果并不明显,集中体现为债务危机的范围由原来的“欧猪五国“扩展到目前的“新重债七国“。危机深化的重要原因在于以ESM为主的援助方与以希腊等国为主的被援助方之间缺乏必要的信任与合作,从而导致了债务危机的蔓延。当前的相关研究鲜有涉及对欧债危机治理过程本身的分析,因而未能就援助方与被援助方之间的合作对策研究提供一个具有说服力的理论基础。基于此,本文利用演化博弈的方法,对欧债危机治理过程中双方之间的行为选择进行深入分析,从中得到的一个基本分析结论是双方合作的基础在于形成对双方行为的约束与激励机制。以此结论为理论基础,可引出关于欧债危机治理对策的政策含义。; The European debt crisis has been about three years, the euro-zone valid doing all kinds of efforts to solve the debt crisis.However, the effect is not obvious, one of the key reasons being that the main donors to the EU and mainly in Greece lack of the necessary trust and cooperation between the donors.Most scholars rarely involving analysis of the governance process of the European debt crisis, they failed to provide a convincing theoretical foundation donors and cooperation between donors.Based on this, the paper makes use of evolutionary game, in-depth analysis of the behavior between the two parties in the governance process of the European debt crisis.The basic conclusion is that the basis for cooperation between the two sides is that the formation of the constraints on the behavior of the parties and incentives.Basis on this conclusion, we can elicit the policy implications of the European debt crisis countermeasures.; 教育部人文社会科学基金规划项目“当代金融主导型资本主义经济内在不稳定性问题研究”(12YJA790081); 国家社科基金青年项目“知识产权保护对我国对外贸易的影响及政策研究”(11CJY073)资助
语种	zh_CN
内容类型	期刊论文
源URL	[http://dspace.xmu.edu.cn/handle/2288/113111]
专题	经济学院－已发表论文
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	袁国龙. 从“欧猪五国”到“新重债七国”——再论欧洲主权债务危机治理, Analysis with Game Evolution on Governance of European Sovereign Debt Crisis[J],2014.
APA	袁国龙.(2014).从“欧猪五国”到“新重债七国”——再论欧洲主权债务危机治理..
MLA	袁国龙."从“欧猪五国”到“新重债七国”——再论欧洲主权债务危机治理".(2014).

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