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	独立董事的明星效应:基于高管薪酬—业绩敏感性的考察; The Star Effect of Independent Directors: From Managerial Pay-Performance Sensitivity Perspective
	罗进辉
	2014-06-08
关键词	独立董事 声誉机制 明星效应 高管薪酬 产权性质 Independent Directors Reputation Mechanism Star Effect Executive Compensation Nature of Property Rights
英文摘要	独立董事治理行为的首要机制是声誉激励,然而这一机制的有效性在中国却长期囿于数据的可获得性而未得到充分检验。基于此,本文首次根据百度中文搜索引擎数据反映的社会知名度来衡量独立董事个人的社会声誉激励强度,进而从高管薪酬—业绩敏感性视角检验了独立董事的社会声誉激励效应——也即所谓的明星效应。实证研究发现,同等条件下,聘请了高社会知名度的明星独立董事的上市公司具有显著更低的高管薪酬—业绩敏感性,即明星独董显著降低了公司高管薪酬契约的有效性,而且这一结果主要反映在薪酬政策不受政府管制的民营上市公司。本文的研究结论丰富了中国独立董事制度有效性相关的文献,特别是揭示了独董不能发挥作用的内在原因。; The prime mechanism for independent directors' governance behavior is the reputation incentive.This is because, theoretically, outside independent directors have incentives to develop reputations as experts in decision control.Most of them are either managers of other corporations or important decision agents in other complex organizations.The value of their human capital depends primarily on their performance as internal decision managers in other organizations.However, due to the limited availability of related data, the effectiveness of this mechanism has not been fully tested in the context of China.In recent years, Internet is becoming more and more popular and the network has become one of most important information vehicles.Any individual information especially, that which concerning social stars can be easily found and quickly known to all on the Internet.It means that the network performs as a reasonable platform to reflect social individuals' popularity and also an effective mechanism to discipline social individuals' good behaviors.Taking advantage of this opportunity, this study explores to measure the extent of independent directors' individual social reputation incentive according to the data from the Internet Search Engine.Specifically, the author searches each full name of all independent directors on the largest and most popular Chinese Internet Search Engine(www.baidu.com) and gets the search number for each independent director.Then the author takes the cut-off point 10% to classify independent directors into star and normal ones by ranking their individual network search numbers.Based on this unique data, he is able to examine the star effect of independent directors from the perspective of managerial pay-performance sensitivity.The author finds that compared with their counterparts without star independent directors, firms with star independent directors have significant lower managerial pay-performance sensitivity.That is, star independent directors do not increase but reduce the effectiveness of managerial compensation contracts.The author argues that the main reason for this is that star independent directors are inevitably captured by internal top managers and thus collude with managers to perform as a useless vase, which results in the exacerbation of manager-owner conflicts.Furthermore, the author finds that the above negative effect of star independent directors mainly reflects in private listed companies whose compensation policies are free of government regulation.; 国家自然科学基金青年项目(71202061)资助
语种	zh_CN
内容类型	期刊论文
源URL	[http://dspace.xmu.edu.cn/handle/2288/103099]
专题	管理学院－已发表论文
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	罗进辉. 独立董事的明星效应:基于高管薪酬—业绩敏感性的考察, The Star Effect of Independent Directors: From Managerial Pay-Performance Sensitivity Perspective[J],2014.
APA	罗进辉.(2014).独立董事的明星效应:基于高管薪酬—业绩敏感性的考察..
MLA	罗进辉."独立董事的明星效应:基于高管薪酬—业绩敏感性的考察".(2014).

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