QQ客服 官方微博 反馈留言

	Applications Barriers to Entry and Exclusive Vertical Contracts in Platform Markets
	James E. Prieger ; Wei-Min Hu
	2012-04-24 ; 2012-04-24
关键词	Vertical Contracts Platform Markets Barriers to Entry
中文摘要	Our study extends the empirical literature on whether vertical restraints are anticompetitive. We focus on exclusive contracting in platform markets, which feature indirect network effects and thus are susceptible to applications barriers to entry. Theory suggests that exclusive contracts in vertical relationships between the platform provider and software supplier can heighten the entry barriers. We test these theories in the home video game market. We measure the impact on hardware demand of the indirect network effects from software. We find that although network effects are present, the marginal exclusive game contributes virtually nothing to console demand. Thus, allowing exclusive vertical contracts in platform markets need not lead to a market structure dominated by one system protected by a hedge of complementary software. Our investigation suggests that bargaining power enjoyed by the best software providers and the skewed distribution of game revenue prevents the foreclosure of rivals through exclusive contracting.
语种	英语
内容类型	期刊论文
源URL	[http://ir.calis.edu.cn/hdl/211010/3908]
专题	北京大学
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	James E. Prieger,Wei-Min Hu. Applications Barriers to Entry and Exclusive Vertical Contracts in Platform Markets[J],2012, 2012.
APA	James E. Prieger,&Wei-Min Hu.(2012).Applications Barriers to Entry and Exclusive Vertical Contracts in Platform Markets..
MLA	James E. Prieger,et al."Applications Barriers to Entry and Exclusive Vertical Contracts in Platform Markets".(2012).

个性服务

查看访问统计

相关权益政策

暂无数据

收藏/分享

除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。