CORC  > 清华大学
供应链伙伴信息共享的博弈与激励
王瑛 ; WANG Ying
2010-07-19 ; 2010-07-19
关键词供应链 非对称信息 信息共享 博弈论 激励 supply chain asymmetric information information sharing gama theory incentives F224.32
其他题名Game and Incentives in the Information Sharing among Supply Chain Members
中文摘要针对产销双方对供求信息掌握的不对称性,分析了实现供应链合作伙伴信息共享的条件,从保证供应链合作伙伴信息共享的实现出发,建立了信息共享的博弈模型,分析了共享需求信息和成本信息前后期望利润变化,提出了在制造商与分销商信息共享的激励机制。通过激励机制,改变Nash均衡解的利润分配,在价格优惠和一次性补贴下,使供应链伙伴均获得信息共享带来的收益增加。; Considering the fact that each of the supply chain members grasps asymmetric information on demanding and supplying,the author analyzes the preconidtions to realize the information sharing among the members.A game model is suggested to share information on demand and cost.The change between the expected profit before sharing and that after sharing is discussed and an incentive mechanism is also proposed to promote the information sharing among the manufactures and the distributors.This incentive mechanism modifies the profit distributed at the point of balanced Nash solution and therefore,with a favorable price and a one-time allowance,the benefits brought by the information sharing of all the supply chain members have been increased.; 国家自然科学基金资助项目(70028102)
语种中文 ; 中文
内容类型期刊论文
源URL[http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/75890]  
专题清华大学
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
王瑛,WANG Ying. 供应链伙伴信息共享的博弈与激励[J],2010, 2010.
APA 王瑛,&WANG Ying.(2010).供应链伙伴信息共享的博弈与激励..
MLA 王瑛,et al."供应链伙伴信息共享的博弈与激励".(2010).
个性服务
查看访问统计
相关权益政策
暂无数据
收藏/分享
所有评论 (0)
暂无评论
 

除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。


©版权所有 ©2017 CSpace - Powered by CSpace