| 银行监督、企业社会性成本与贷款融资体系 | |
| 倪铮 ; 张春 | |
| 2010-06-07 ; 2010-06-07 | |
| 关键词 | 银行监督 企业社会性成本 贷款融资体系 事前筛选 贷款利率 Bank Monitoring Social Bankruptcy Cost Bank Loan Financing System Ex-Ante Screening Lending Interest Rate F832.4 F224 |
| 其他题名 | Banks' Pro-screening,Social Bankruptcy Cost and Bank Loan Financing System |
| 中文摘要 | 本文从政府机构控股国有企业所造成的企业行为扭曲的角度来研究银行贷款策略组合的微观机制,即银行对国有企业和私营企业进行事前筛选的程度及贷款利率设定,并建立了关于银行贷款融资体系的微观模型和理论框架。首先,将企业社会性成本和银行监督功能(事前筛选)引入债务合同模型,说明国有企业在面临破产做清算决策时会考虑到社会破产成本,从而推导出国有企业的还款机制有别于私营企业,信息不对称条件下银行事前对贷款筛选的激励也会有所不同,并提供了一般性推导和数值解拟合分析;同时,事前筛选存在一定的反转效应,因此需要就监督效率的社会剩余价值进行权衡。; This Paper has established the micro theoretical model for bank loan financing system based on ex ante screening and social bankruptcy cost.We find that State-Owned Enterprises(SOEs)and Private-Owned Enterprises(POEs)act differently when it comes to bankruptcy and repayment of bank loans,which in turn will affect the terms of bank lending and the incentive banks to screen these two types of firms under information asymmetry.We also provide the general calculation and numerical solution analysis(calibration process).Concerning the uncertainty of ex ante screening efficiency,we find that ex ante screening would produce the reverse impact so the social surplus trade off is necessary. |
| 语种 | 中文 ; 中文 |
| 内容类型 | 期刊论文 |
| 源URL | [http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/39229]  |
| 专题 | 清华大学 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | 倪铮,张春. 银行监督、企业社会性成本与贷款融资体系[J],2010, 2010. |
| APA | 倪铮,&张春.(2010).银行监督、企业社会性成本与贷款融资体系.. |
| MLA | 倪铮,et al."银行监督、企业社会性成本与贷款融资体系".(2010). |
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