| 一个具有双寡头垄断性质的三边贸易模型——以石油市场为例的国家福利实验模拟分析 | |
| 李颢 ; 周力扬 ; LI Hao ; ZHOU Li-yang | |
| 2010-06-07 ; 2010-06-07 | |
| 关键词 | Cournot双寡头垄断 净进口 一般均衡 Cournot duopoly net importer general equilibrium F746 F416.22 F224 |
| 其他题名 | A Trilateral Trade Model with the Duopoly Feature:Experimental Simulation Analysis of State Welfare Based on World Oil Market |
| 中文摘要 | 中国作为大宗商品的国际大买家,争取国际定价权已经成为再也无法回避的问题。有鉴于此出,文章以石油为例,着重探讨石油定价战略选择的经济学机理,在一个具有双寡头垄断性质的三边贸易体系中,对OPEC和非OPEC石油输出国之间的博弈进行了一般均衡分析。根据模型设定参数及实验模拟发现,在Cournot双寡头垄断下,国家M的福利水平增加32.4%,而国家F的福利水平却下降0.8%。由此作出的解释是:与M相反,F是石油净进口国家,高油价和商品y较低的相对价格所产生的负面效应要大于闲暇带来的正面效应。此时,整个社会福利下降0.7%。石油在消费者效用函数中的权重较小时,石油生产的一个负向冲击对福利损失的影响非常有限。在F和M的纯策略集合{双寡头垄断,完全竞争,不生产石油}中,存在唯一的纳什均衡{完全竞争,完全竞争},这使得国家H和F从中获益。模型给人的启示是,除了尽快完善国家石油战略储备体系外,中国应积极参与到石油定价权的争夺中,改变目前完全被动承受油价变动影响的不利地位。; As a big international buyer of bulk commodity,China should strive for the pricing power in the international market. Taking oil market as an example,the paper focuses on the economic mechanism for the strategic choice of oil pricing,and gives a general equilibrium analysis for the world oil market dominated by OPEC oil exporters and NON-OPEC ones in a trilateral trade system with the duopoly feature. There are three countries,H,F and M,and three types of goods,x,y and z (oil). H is endowed with good x,F is endowed with good y and also produces oil (z). M is an oil producing country and supplies oil only. Then it considers two types of oil market structure:Cournot duopoly (F and M set their oil supply or price simultaneously) and perfect competition. The results find that the welfare in M rises by 32.4% and the one in F falls by 0.8% under Cournot duopoly. This can be explained by the terms of trade effect. Contrast to M,F is a net oil importer,and the negative effect caused by high oil price and low comparative price of commodity y dominates the gains from leisure. The total social welfare decreases by 0.7%. In case of a small weight of oil in consumer utility function,a negative shock of oil production has limited impacts on welfare loss. In a game theoretic approach with a finite strategy set of {duopoly,perfect competition,not oil} for F and M,there exists a unique Nash equilibrium {perfect competition,perfect competition},from which H and F could benefit. It suggests that,in addition to the improvement of the national oil reserve system,China should take an active part in the oil pricing,in order to change the unfavorable position of passively bearing the impact of oil price changes. |
| 语种 | 中文 ; 中文 |
| 内容类型 | 期刊论文 |
| 源URL | [http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/38627]  |
| 专题 | 清华大学 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | 李颢,周力扬,LI Hao,等. 一个具有双寡头垄断性质的三边贸易模型——以石油市场为例的国家福利实验模拟分析[J],2010, 2010. |
| APA | 李颢,周力扬,LI Hao,&ZHOU Li-yang.(2010).一个具有双寡头垄断性质的三边贸易模型——以石油市场为例的国家福利实验模拟分析.. |
| MLA | 李颢,et al."一个具有双寡头垄断性质的三边贸易模型——以石油市场为例的国家福利实验模拟分析".(2010). |
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