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	Asymmetric demand information and channel profits when retailers compete
	Xiao, B ; Lin, L ; Zhang, AL
	2010-05-10 ; 2010-05-10
会议名称	SHAPING BUSINESS STRATEGY IN A NETWORKED WORLD, VOLS 1 AND 2, PROCEEDINGS ; 4th International Conference on Electronic Business (ICEB 2004) ; Beijing, PEOPLES R CHINA ; Web of Science
关键词	supply chain channels of distribution game theory PRICE-COMPETITION COMMON RETAILER Computer Science, Artificial Intelligence Engineering, Electrical & Electronic Telecommunications
中文摘要	We consider a supply chain with a sin le manufacturer selling a single product through two competing retailers. The manufacturer sets the wholesale price, and the retailers set the retail margin, simultaneously. The demand information among the members is asymmetric. The main contribution of this paper is extended the results of [5] with two competing retailers under asymmetric demand information. We consider six cases with the manufacturer or the retailers whether owning the information or not, and analyze these six cases in turn solve for a Bayesian equilibrium. Some results are obtained finally.
会议录出版者	INTERNATIONAL ACADEMIC PUBLISHERS LTD ; HONG KONG ; UNIT 1205, 12 FLOOR, SINO PLAZA, 255 GLOUCESTER ROAD, HONG KONG 00000, CAUSEWAY BAY, PEOPLES R CHINA
语种	英语 ; 英语
内容类型	会议论文
源URL	[http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/18776]
专题	清华大学
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Xiao, B,Lin, L,Zhang, AL. Asymmetric demand information and channel profits when retailers compete[C]. 见:SHAPING BUSINESS STRATEGY IN A NETWORKED WORLD, VOLS 1 AND 2, PROCEEDINGS, 4th International Conference on Electronic Business (ICEB 2004), Beijing, PEOPLES R CHINA, Web of Science.

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